Your Directory Has Been Breached – landing page
This is a landing page for a project Bob Bobel and I have been working on recently. Today (May 30th, 2012), I am presenting the first draft of the slides which will be posted shortly. A white paper is due out shortly. All information will be posted on this page, so it will be revised in the coming weeks.
(2012-05-30 - 13:00 ET)
First up, here is Bob's initial post on the topic:
http://www.bobbobel.com/active-directory-was-compromised-now-what/
(2012-05-30 - 16:15 ET)
Here is the slide deck just presented at the Department of Energy NLIT Conference (National Laboratories IT Summit):
http://www.federalcto.com/quest/breached-directory.pptx
(2012-06-05 - 18:00 ET)
Here is the first (rough) draft of the document to correspond with the slides. Yes, whole sections are missing, and will be filled in during the coming weeks. Stayed tuned.
http://www.federalcto.com/quest/breached-directory.docx
Think there’s no cold war?
You think the cold war is over? You think things have settled? Have a read of this article - Full on hacking and cyber warfare is going on as we calmly surf the web. Have a read of this Business Week article: China-Based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War
Meant to mention
I put up a post on 2-factor authentication here: http://www.idmwizard.com/2011/10/31/quest-on-2-factor-and-3-factor-authentication/ that can be considered an addendum to the last post I had here.
Going forward, this blog is going to be more about my travel and observations in my job as Quest's Federal CTO, and the IDM Wizard site will be for the more technical, identity-focused activity. With any luck, that site may have a new contributor as well, which is why I'm looking to revive it.
Wait! I thought the Feds only cared about smartcards . . .
Monday, I posted how Quest's tokens allow for users to program their own seeds. Which then prompted questions (internally) of, "Why do you even care? I thought you focused on the Federal space, and the Feds only cared about PAP, or CIV cards?"
Well, yes. For the most part, the US Federal government does focus on CAC (Common Access Card - used by the DOD), and PIV (Personal Identification Verification - mostly used by the civilian agencies) cards. And you'll also hear about PIV-I (PIV Interoperable) being involved. In the case of CAC and PIV, a user has to file an application, and some Federal agency would need to sponsor the individual to obtain such a card. This usually includes a background check, or some sort of formal review, before the card is issued. PIV-I tried to lower this barrier, by allowing non-Federal organizations (think government contractors, state governments, first responders, etc) to issue interoperable smartcards that are trusted by Federal systems.
However, PIV-I has a lower "assurance level," and often involves the same (or similar) sort of background check, just by a different organization. Assurance Levels are set by NIST and can be found detailed in their Special Publication (SP) 800-63. You'll see there are 4 assurance levels, and PIV-I only gets to level 2 (really, it gets to level 3, but with a less stringent background check, it can only be considered level 2.5 at best). CAC & PIV strive for level 4, if not level 3.
Ok. So we've established that smartcards are the main vehicle for 2-factor authentication in the Federal government, but I still haven't explained why tokens (RSA and other ones) crop up. And this is because a token is also an acceptable form of 2-factor authentication (read SP 800-63. and you'll see them mentioned as 'one-time passwords'). The "identity proofing" is still required, but tokens are actually a lot more flexible for several reasons.
1. Tokens can be assigned to any user (part 1). In the case of smartcards, they are usually assigned to people, while tokens can be shared. In fact, with our tokens, users can share tokens, but continue to use their distinct credentials (username and password) with the token. Which means that multiple admins can share a token to access a common system, but you can determine which admin logged in to do something with the particular token. This lets you continue to have 2 factor authentication, but also a "check-in/check-out" system for the particular token, allow more controls over the physical token (perhaps locked away in a safe or vault).
1a. Tokens can be assigned to any user (part 2). This is really a corrollary to 1, which is that the token can be assigned to service, or privileged accounts. Putting in the same sharing (check-in/check-out) model for a token, plus tie the password to a password vault product, and you have some pretty solid security around your privileged accounts such as oracle, root, Administrator, and other 'non-named' accounts.
2. Tokens are independent of environment. With smartcards, you have to have a reader attached to the user's console. No reader, or a malfunctioning reader, makes authentication a bit more difficult (read not possible). There are also situations where PKI simply isn't used. Older applications or platforms that do not make use of certificates cannot be changed quickly or easily. With a token, along with a username and password/PIN, you can continue to get 2FA, even in a scenario where a reader isn't available or not practical, or the app is expecting only a username and password. There is still some amount of work to be done, but it's often easier than tying an app into an entire PKI infrastructure.
2a. Tokens are independent of environment. There are some cases where the app or platform is capable of using PKI, but it is sitting in a location/area/network that simply cannot reach the PKI infrastructure to which the certificate on the smartcard is tied to. Not every system is actually on the internet (unbelievable, I know), which means tokens can provide access without requiring a centrally managed CA (certificate authority) to be present.
3. Tokens can be assigned much quicker and easier. And this is really the crux of why tokens come into play in the Federal space. Smartcards require a centrally issued certificate to be put onto the card. In some cases, there is no time for the requests to make their way through the system to get a certificate, publish it to a CA (certificate authority) and card, and get the card to the user. In other cases, the user simply will not get through a background check (or unwilling to get one), but has to be given access to certain systems. Yes, there are times when the Federal government has to deal with "questionable people" but they might as well make sure it's the right person, so 2-factor is still needed.
3a. Tokens can be revoked much quicker and easier. Because the token is usually some bit of plastic, it's easier to revoke and know that it won't be used in other ways. Most smartcards take a while to issue because they are also printed as a security badge. Meaning that even if the certificate on the card is revoked, the card may still be usable to get physical access to a building or location. However, it's unlikely that an agency will let you in because you have a black piece of plastic on your keychain.
So, with those all those reasons, tokens are not going away. Smartcards will continue to dominate, but there will continue to be a need for 2-factor authentication (2FA) using one-time passwords (OTP) in the Federal space.
The RSA Breach saga continues . . .
I've discussed the RSA breach before, but had a very interesting conversation last week with a customer that was in a dilemma as to what to do. RSA have said they would replace some of the tokens, depending on the situation (protecting Intellectual Property, Consumer-Oriented products, etc) and this customer was pretty certain they were to get new tokens from RSA, but didn't know if they wanted them. Nor do they want any other "standard" token that other vendors could provide, because that new vendor could be breached as well.
What this client really wanted was a token where he could program his own seed into it. I mentioned that our software tokens actually allow for this out of the box, and when you "program" a new soft token, the seed is automatically generated. Which means that Quest never knows what the seed record is for any software token that we provide. For an example of this, you can actually see a recording of it here where the seed is generated, and then here where the seed is put into our Desktop token (there is no audio on either recording).
However, this wasn't as interesting to him as programmable hardware tokens. He had concerns about keys getting compromised while being transferred to the end user, and wanted to send a pre-programmed hardware device. At first, I didn't think we had anything like that in our arsenal, however, it turns out that one of our latest token models (The Yubikey token) as well as some of other ones already allow for user programmability! In fact, if you look at the link for the Yubikey token, and then scroll down, you'll see that some are programmable. It took our Defender Product Manager (Stu Harrison, who blogs on and off here) to point this out to me, even though I should have remembered this from earlier on.
Obviously, each token does come with a default seed that Quest will know about, but if there was concern about a vendor having the "keys to the kingdom," a programmable token puts the onus back on the organization, and keeps Quest out of the limelight. I don't want to discount the fact that this will take more manpower, but if you don't want your vendors to have your seed records, reprogramming the tokens is the only secure way of doing it. It only makes sense, and as a security professional, you should never rely on RSA, Quest or any organization if you can minimize the number of people that have access to the token seed records.
Best Buy Security Breach waiting to happen
Seems like there's one breach after another these days, and organizations are leaking data. You would think that a retailer would want to minimize this sort of thing to keep up relations. Apparently, not Best Buy.
I bought a $35 game on BestBuy.com only to find out I already purchased this earlier. So I took the online purchase, that only arrived at my door 2-3 days ago, back to the local Best Buy (the Mall of Georgia one). I handed over the game (unpackaged) and the packing slip when the gal behind the return counter asked for my driver's license. I showed it to her, thinking she just wants to verify me, but she starts typing in the license number.
"Wait, what are you doing? You don't need my driver's license number," I say as I hide my license before she finished. "Sorry, but this is required. Would you like to speak to a manager?" is her reply. "Yes, please," I say.
Christie Bee, the manager, waddles over and just says "I cannot process a return without a license." And there's no way to return something without some ID. I offer up the American Express it was bought on, but that is not good enough. I've got other things to do, and don't have time to argue with Christie about the silliness of all this, and that it violates their agreement with American Express, so I leave in a huff.
About 10 minutes ago, I came home, filed a dispute with AmEx, and told them the store is unwilling to take the return. It looks like American Express is doing the right thing, and I have no doubt they'll resolve this for me.
But the bigger question is . . . Why would Best Buy take on this risk? I understand the whole fraud issue, which is why they're doing this. But the minute they get hacked, every person's driver's license, along with street address and other info, is going to get taken. I have a Rewards Zone account, as well as the credit card it was purchased on. And this is a $35 item from long time customer.
So to Best Buy, I pose these questions to you; Why on earth would you ask me to give up my identity to you like this? Do you really expect me to trust you with this information? And why would you want to store this information in the first place? Surely you can think of a better way to handle fraud without taking something so sensitive.
Until this changes, Best Buy won't be getting any more of purchases.
Technology on the battlefield and “The Golden Hour”
Government Computing News has just published an article on smartphones on the battefield, and within the Defense sector specifically. That article can be read here: http://gcn.com/Articles/2011/05/03/Cyber-defense-handheld-encryption.aspx . It's a very good article, and one that highlights the challenges with using commercial products in a military or intelligence setting, where the stakes are much higher in some cases.
But it reminded me of a presentation I saw late last year about "The Golden Hour" from Air Commodore Tony Boyle (UK Defence Operations Board) and the use of technology to help get medical attention to wounded combatants much faster. The Golden Hour is a medical term originally coined by the military to describe that window of opportunity (usually 60 minutes) to save a life after severe trauma occurs. And while there is controversy (see the wikipedia article on this here) about it's validity, there is absolutely no doubt that getting a wounded solider proper medical care faster raises the survival odds.
The overall presentation was titled "Future Networks - Enabling Defence Interoperability and Interconnectivity" and he also got into the military doing more with COTS (Commercial Off The Shelf) systems, as well as looking at private industry for 'best practices' and practical savings. What follow's is my Quest colleague's (Ian Davidson) write-up of the presentation.
He gave some insights into how technology is actually used in theatre – some of which may seem obvious but nonetheless was very interesting.
One “vignette” was regarding an incident with Viking Patrol in Lashkar Gah :
When the IED went off, a 9 line text message was automatically sent to multiple places with differing results :
- One text message went to a Hermes ISTAR which automatically deployed it to the location of the explosion to monitor the area immediately
- Another text message went to a 904 squadron to deploy a Harrier which arrived in the area within 6 minutes.
- Another went to the Casualty Ops – the result of which was that 9 doctors/surgeons were lined up waiting when the casualties arrived – and had been automatically notified of blood type/ full history/allergies etc.
This combination of events lead to the casualties being dealt with by medics– well within “The Golden Hour” – the period of 60 minutes after sever trauma in which casualties are most likely to survive . In fact they were on the operating tables within 15 minutes of the device going off.
The whole point of this story was to illustrate how the military on joint operations depend on sharing information collaboratively in order to ensure the success of any given military operation – no pun intended.
“No secrets” between different military “departments” and deployments mean that soldiers survive based on a POST and subscribe method.
Each operating division posts information that is likely to be identified as a serious threat or something requiring immediate attention, and others can subscribe to that information.
He then went on to discuss the different business models that have come around over the last 10 years and how increasingly open systems via the internet allow for people to become enabled to share information sensibly – using an analogy about Amazon re: systems training. i.e. “No one goes to school to learn how to order books from Amazon”.
He also discussed ideas around redefining what needs to be secret and what doesn’t – stating that (as an example) in the case of military personnel ordering clothing provisions – there is no real need for it to be “so “ secure and locked down internally.
Why not use M & S for shirts for example – the worst thing that can happen is that M & S get hacked by another foreign country and he potentially gets the wrong shirt size delivered !
(For the non-UK based folks, M & S is Marks & Spence, a UK department store similar to Nordstrom).
Overall, it was a great presentation, making the case for using technology to it's fullest extent, and making sure people are comfortable with whatever model you set up.
Amazon in the Federal space? Absolutely!
I work for Quest Software, and focus on making sure that we are helping our Federal customers. So when one of our account managers asked me to me with Amazon, I was a little skeptical. Amazon? Really? I mean, I know the Feds have the "Cloud-First" initiative, and there are some things here and there, but can we really work with Amazon? What can we do with an organization that doesn't do anything with most of the platforms we support?
There's no Oracle, no Microsoft, PeopleSoft, SAP and so on. They don't even offer email that we can migrate to or from.
Well, it was an hour and a half well spent, and I am absolutely jazzed about some of the things we discussed. It turns out they are very, very serious about Security (with a capital S). In the Fed space, that is the number one objection to anything Cloud related. But they not only went through some of the certs and reviews they'd had (even a SAS 70 audit, which I think pretty highly of, having been involved in one years back) but their overall architecture and philosophy. They are keenly aware of the federal requirements that are out there, and have made a substantial commitment to making sure that their federal customers are able to use their solutions
Yes, they had an outage last week, but if you have concerns about these things, you should talk to Amazon about what can be done to prevent it. The outage was Amazon's fault, but there's also options (that obviously cost) which could be implemented to avoid such a thing happening. You can find a lot more info on the outage here.
In any case, it turns out they have a lot of options, including all the way down to a VPN secured environment, if that is your requirement. And because everything is web-based, and often accessible via web services, I think there are a few solutions that Quest have that could be used with Amazon's platforms. The conversation ranged from monitoring, to management and provisioning of resources, as well as integration with internal systems, and potentially even things like SSO and access controls. Lou J (the Quest Account Manager) even learned about Cloudbursting.
I hope to explore those options in the coming months, especially with some specific Federal customers in mind.
This why we have standards
Blah, blah, blah
RSA breached
Blah, blah, blah
The last week or so has been really interesting. Yes, one of the hot topics is the RSA breach. I'm not going to link to it - if you haven't heard by now, I'll wait until you google it, and then come back.
For me, the interesting part was that it was an APT (Advanced Persistent Threat). It's a hot topic in the Fed space, but most on the commercial side have never heard of it (want to know more about APT? Check out this 30 minute session I did a few weeks ago). However, our internal discussions started going down the "are we vulnerable to this same attack with our Defender product?" I replied with some glib comment saying, "No. Duh!" and went on. Not really, and it was much more pleasant, but it was definitely short on details as to why. But the conversations continued. Now, for someone on the outside, I probably would have given a more detailed answer, however I thought it was obvious that being standards-based, as we are, we avoid this sort of attack simply by following the rules instead of creating our own.
Well, last night, the questions continued, so I put together much of what is below in an email to explain. The gist of this is that Defender support OATH which means that we can use any token to provide 2-factor authentication and the algorithm used to calculate the next "random" value is a standard. By using a standard, a breach of the code simply isn't possible. Why? Because the code is already public. There's nothing to hide, so there's nothing to steal. And what that means is if there's a problem, it is with the token seed records.
For those that don't know, one-time password tokens all operate on a pre-defined seed. That seed is used to calculate the next password by the device. And when I say device, I include software tokens, and any other "thing" that provides a 1-time password. RSA does it, we do it, everyone does it. That seed is unique to the device, and kept secret by the owner of the token. Here's where things become interesting.
If you steal the seed records, you only have 1/3 the puzzle in getting to someone's login. Not only do you need the seed (to calculate the next, unique password), but you also need to know the account it's tied as well as the 'something you know' part of 2 factor authentication, which is usually a PIN or a predefined password. In the case of Defender, most customers use the AD password, which is usually better than a 4 digit PIN but that's irrelevant for this conversation. However, knowing someone has your seed record, as a user, ought to make you nervous. If one of the two factors you rely on is compromised, then it's no longer 2-factor, now is it?
The next bit is a direct copy/paste from the email I wrote. Vasco is one of our token suppliers, and the ones make the Go tokens we most often use for demos. So it's the one most people inside of Quest are familiar with, which is why I used them in the example below.
--
To add to this, let's say Vasco have a breach, and they get both source code from Vasco, as well as all their token seed records, including those of our clients. And the breach is so bad, they get our purchase orders (from Vasco) and maybe even see which tokens may have been drop shipped to our clients on our behalf. That's pretty bad.
But none of that mean you need to rip out and replace Defender. Our client can simply say, "We no longer trust Vasco tokens, and will switch to [insert name of OATH token vendor]." The Defender server stays intact, nothing needs to be changed, upgraded or patched. The customer simply gets a new set of tokens, loads them up, and gives the token to their users for self-service registration.
In the case of RSA, they are a tightly coupled system, where tokens, algorithms and authentication servers are all tied together. If you don't trust RSA, and feel they've been compromised, then you need to throw out the whole lot. In our case, Defender simply cannot be compromised in that way as we don't do anything secretly or have proprietary algorithms. OATH is published. RADIUS is published. If you trust those standards, then Defender is fine. The same for AD - we store our data there, but its a "pseudo-standard" where it's ubiquitous, and there's no deep dark secrets about it.
This is why I keep saying that our approach is more sound, and ultimately, more trustworthy. Not because our code is better (it may be but RSA have some clever folks, too) but because our entire approach/methodology does more to protect the client from a breach such as this.
There's still a cost, and you have to throw out the tokens, but you don't need to learn a new toolset, and plan a migration from one auth system to another. Especially in a stressful time when your CISO is breathing down your neck, asking how much of a threat is this.
--
That was really it. I don't have much more to add at this point. Other than maybe that we have a really cool, new token from Yubico called a Yubikey. You should ask for a demo, but it's something you have to see in person. USB-Based, but works on Windows, Macs, Unix, etc. Very clever, that token.